ABSTRACT
This study examines systematic forms of corruption reinforced by technology under the pressures of neoliberal competition and the pursuit of high profits. Its main argument is that corruption should not be regarded solely as a historical deviation associated with underdeveloped countries; rather, it can also emerge in technologically advanced developed economies, particularly within Western multinational corporations. To test this argument, the study conducts a comparative case analysis of Enron, Lehman Brothers, and Volkswagen, selected through purposive sampling, in order to investigate how technology-enabled forms of corruption are produced, concealed, and sustained. The theoretical framework of the study is based on Risk Society Theory, which emphasizes that technology generates not only beneficial outcomes but also new forms of systemic risk, and Principal-Agent Theory, which explains how information asymmetry and conflicts of interest may enable technology to be used as a tool for concealing corruption. The findings show that intensive technology use played a central role in the emergence of corrupt practices in the collapse of Enron as a typical case, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as an outlier/ extreme case, and Volkswagen’s Dieselgate scandal as a critical case. Accordingly, the study argues that regulatory frameworks should be expanded, risk-based auditing should be strengthened, and technology-enabled control mechanisms should be developed to prevent technology-based corruption.